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TIES THAT BIND 
THE CRAliT OF POLITICAL NETWORKING IN 
LATE MING CHIANG-NAN 
sY 
JIE ZHAO 
University of Southern Maine 
In 1595 Tung Fen WSh' (b. 1510), one of Chiang-nan's prominent 
retired scholar-officials, passed away. His passing should have 
been the occasion for great family pride and satisfaction. He died 
at 86, immensely wealthy, prestigious, and well connected. He 
had served as a Han-lin academician and Minister of Rites during 
the late Chia-ching mt period, and his son and grandsons were 
chin-shih. He had been able to indulge in material pleasures 
uninterruptedly for many years. In a biography written shortly 
after his death, his grandson, Tung Ssu-ch'eng W1MS, described 
him as a man with a long beard and piercing eyes, who was well 
regarded for his literary talent both at court and in literati 
circles.l Very few people indeed could equal him in the achieve- 
ment of power, wealth, and academic success. 
But there was a cloud over the last rites. Tung Fen himself had 
specified that a banner of grievance be draped over his casket, 
identiting him as "a man who has suffered tremendous humili- 
ations."2 This last word to his family conveyed his bitter feelings 
about a traumatic crisis they had just been through. During his 
last two years, an outburst of local protests against his family 
turned his life into a nightmare. Thousands of local people were 
clamoring for justice against them and lodging countless lawsuits. 
1 After the death of his grandfather, Tung Ssu-ch'eng asked his maternal 
grandfather Mao K'un (see below) to write a biography of Tung Fen. Mao K'un 
wrote the account based on the material provided by Tung Ssu-ch'eng and he 
adopted Tung Ssu-ch'eng's voice in this work. It is appropriate therefore to view 
it as a collaboration of Mao K'un and Tung Ssu-ch'eng. See Mao K'un wen-chi, 
biography of Tung Fen, ch. 3, p. 24b. [For complete citations see end Bibliog- 
raphy.] 
2 Ibid., p. 24b. 
(C) Brill, Leiden, 2000 T'oung Pao LXXXVI 
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This had triggered a provincial investigation and caused division 
within Tung Fen's family. The Tungs had lost a fair amount of 
property. Clouding the elegant image of Tung Fen in his grand- 
son's account was a darker picture painted by the testimony of his 
critics, friends, and even kinsmen. 
However, despite the crisis, Tung Fen's family escaped almost 
certain catastrophe. Its wealth remained relatively intact. The 
demonstrations and lawsuits went away. And the provincial offi- 
cials who were investigating Tung's misdeeds were removed from 
office. This narrow escape was all due to the fact that Tung Fen 
was a master at political connections, and even in his final 
months of life he was able to use them to thwart and punish his 
pursuers. 
Tung Fen's official career, the connections he forged, and the 
political skills and cunning with which he maintained and ma- 
nipulated those connections, enabled him to confront and even- 
tually topple the provincial administration of his native Che- 
chiang. His case offers us a dramatic opportunity to observe how 
networks could be built up to link both central and local politics, 
and how they could function over a period of many years to 
further and protect the interests of great families, both while 
their principal members participated in court politics and when 
they confined themselves to the local affairs of their own home 
provinces.3 
3 Professor Saeki Yuichi has published a study of the Hu-chou disturbance 
entitled "Mimmatsu no T6 shi no hen," in Toyoshi Kenkyui, vol. 16, no. 1 (1957), 
pp. 26-57. His study focuses primarily on the disturbance and its local social 
impact. The social, economic, and political structure of Ming society has been 
the subject of numerous studies. Two important works which explore the eco- 
nomic and social aspects of urban and rural Chiang-nan are Fu 1-ling, Ming-tai 
Chiang-nan shih-min ching-chi shih-t'an (Shanghai: Shanghai jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 
1957) and Hamashima Atsutoshi, Mindai Konan noson shakai no kenkyut (Tokyo: 
Tokyo University Press, 1982). Cultural and commercial connections and net- 
works of the Ming have been studied in Nelson Wu, "Tung Ch'i-ch'ang: apathy 
in government and fervor in art," in Arthur Wright and Denis Twitchett, eds., 
Confucian Personalities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); Yu Ying-shih, 
"Chung-kuo chin-shih tsung-chiao lun-li yiu shang-jen ching-shen," in his Shih yui 
Chung-kuo wen-hua (Shanghai: Shanghai jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1987); John 
Meskill, Gentlemanly Interests and Wealth on the Yangtze Delta (Ann Arbor: the 
Association for Asian Studies, Inc. Monograph and Occasional Paper Series, no. 
49, 1994); and Timothy Brook, The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture 
in Ming China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Works which 
discuss late Ming politics and the social upheaval include Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming- 
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Tung Fen's high-level network and his official career, 1541-1565 
A chin-shih of 1541, Tung Fen entered officialdom at a time 
when the capricious Chia-ching emperor (r. 1522-1566) pro- 
moted, dismissed, and even executed officials at a whim, and 
when court politics was dominated by Yen Sung iRA (1480-1565), 
the senior grand secretary who could make or break careers at 
will. At the peak of Yen's power, Hsiu Chieh 1 (1503-1583), 
himself a grand secretary, behaved submissively "as if he were 
Yen's concubine."4 Several scholar-officials who held high ethical 
standards were exiled, jailed, and even killed for their sharp criti- 
cism of government policies. In this nasty and merciless environ- 
ment, Tung quickly learned how to survive and made his way by 
using his considerable talent to please the powerful. 
Tung Fen's duty as a Han-lin academician was to draft imperial 
pronouncements and to meet the various demands of the Chia- 
ching emperor, including Taoist erotica. He studied the 
emperor's moods and then composed pieces which cleverly ca- 
tered to the monarch's sexual and religious fantasies.5 Occasion- 
ally he would receive imperial orders to draft essays three times 
in the same evening, an indication of the emperor's satisfaction. 
Based on this ability he became the emperor's favorite Han-lin 
academician and was granted the special privilege of riding a 
horse in the imperial compound.6 
However, Tung Fen knew very well that winning the emperor's 
favor alone would not make him secure nor put him on the fast 
track to high office. Since most senior positions were held by Yen 
Sung's trusted men, his chances for promotion were dependent 
on his personal relationship to Yen. Unfortunately, one type of 
connection commonly used, the teacher-disciple relationship 
Ch'ing chih-chi tang-she yun-tung kao (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chui, 1982) and 
Nakayama Hachir6, "Ban Min no doka dohen," in his Min Shin shi ronshui (To- 
kyo: Ky-uko Shoin, 1995). The present paper revisits the Hu-chou disturbance 
first studied by Saeki Yfiichi, using Tung Fen as a case study to illustrate how late 
Ming political networks linked central and local politics together. I am greatly 
indebted to Professor Craig Dietrich for his advice and editing in the course of 
revising this paper for publication. 
4 Wu Yuan-ts'ui, Lin-chii man-lu, ch. 2, p. 92. 
5 Shen Te-fu, Wan-li yeh-huo pien, ch. 2, pp. 157-158. 
6 Shen Shih-hsing, Ssu-hsien-t'ang chi, epitaph of Tung Fen, ch. 29, pp. 9a-b. 
Also see Mao K'un wen-chi, ch. 3, p. 20b. 
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within the civil service examinations, was out of the question. As 
a member of the 1541 class, Tung Fen automatically became a 
"student" of Hsui Chieh, the chief of the metropolitan examina- 
tion of that year. Since Hsui was now Yen's rival for power, this 
teacher-disciple relationship could bring Tung nothing but diffi- 
culties; it could cause Yen's faction to suppose that he was Hsu's 
man. 
Tung Fen approached Yen Sung through other means. Among 
Yen's friends and allies were three strategically placed officials, 
who combined a formidable amount of civilian and military 
power.7 One was Lu Ping li7- (1510-1560), Chief of the Imperial 
Guards, who headed the imperial secret agency. Another was Wu 
P'eng A (1500-1579), Minister of Personnel, a key post for 
placing supporters in office. A third was Chu Hsi-chung , 
(1516-1572), Duke of Ch'eng-kuo 1 who commanded the 
military defense of the capital. Yen Sung had kinship relation- 
ships with this trio. He married his grandson to Chu's daughter, 
one of his granddaughters to Lu's son, and another granddaugh- 
ter to Wu's grandson.8 Meanwhile, one of Wu's daughters was the 
wife of Lu Ping's son.9 
Seeking connections, Tung Fen discovered this web. To start 
with, both Lu Ping and Wu P'eng were his fellow provincials from 
Che-chiang, a useful link. More important, he managed to have 
his daughter engaged to the son of Chu Hsi-chung, who, as we 
have seen, was related to Yen Sung.'0 This gave Tung a very 
important entry to Yen. Then when his own wife died, Tung cast 
his eye upon Wu P'eng's youngest girl, who, however, was incon- 
veniently engaged to another man. To handle this difficulty, Yen 
Shih-fan iRtU (1513-1565, Yen Sung's son) stepped in as a me- 
7 Yen Sung actively sought strong support from Chu Hsi-chung and Lu 
Ping, the emperor's two watchdogs. Through his marriage ties with them, a solid 
alliance between the civil and military powers was thus cemented. See Ming-shih, 
biography of Yang Chi-sheng, ch. 209, p. 5540; biography of Lu Ping, ch. 307, 
pp. 7892-7894. 
8 Sheng Feng, Chia-ho cheng-hsien-lu, ch. 4, p. 2b. 
9 Tung Fen, Mi-yuan chi, biography of Wu P'eng, ch. 31, p. 9b. Also see 
Huang Hung-hsien's Pi-shan hsueh-shih chi, biography of Wu P'eng's wife, ch. 6, 
p. 3b. 
10 Tung Fen, biography of Chu Hsi-chung's mother, ch. 31, p. 13a. Appar- 
ently, Tung's daughter died before the marriage took place. Chu Hsi-chung's 
son later married Lu Ping's daughter. 
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diator, leading Wu to dissolve his daughter's prior commitment 
and to marry her to Tung.11 Thus through marriage, Yen Sung 
and Tung Fen were both related to Chu Hsi-chung, while Yen, 
Tung, and Lu Ping were all related to Wu P'eng.12 
Tung Fen made good use of these connections. For example, 
when his son entered the examination hall for the provincial 
examination, he was escorted by Lu Ping's imperial guards, a 
clear display to Che-chiang provincial officials of Tung Fen's 
powerful friends.13 Beyond mere ostentation, Tung's official ca- 
reer advanced nicely. While retaining his Han-lin appointment, 
he moved back and forth between the ministries of Personnel 
and Works, serving as deputy minister in both. And although in 
1561 Hsui Chieh blocked his promotion to Minister of Personnel, 
he was later appointed Minister of Rites.14 
Much to his dismay, Tung Fen could not savor this achievement 
for long, as it came just on the eve of Yen Sung's downfall at the 
hands of Hsfu Chieh. It was too late for Tung to switch his loyalty 
to the new paramount official. In any case, Hsui considered him 
greedy, cunning, and shameless.15 Hsfi Chieh proceeded to purge 
Yen's faction in the following years, as a result of which Tung Fen 
was expelled from the government in 1565.16 It should be 
pointed out that Tung received a much milder dismissal than 
others. Whereas Yen's other associates were officially condemned, 
he was quietly terminated with no official denunciation. How he 
managed this remains unknown. There is no question, however, 
Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 512. 
12 Marriage politics served as a useful tool for the power holders to cultivate 
their political ties and smooth the relationships among themselves. In the case 
of Lu Ping, his sons-in-law included Yen Sung's grandson, Hsui Chieh's son, and 
Chu Hsi-chung's son; and one of his sons married Wu P'eng's daughter. See 
Feng Shih-ko's Feng Yuan-ch'eng hsiian-chi, ch. 46, p. 70b. 
13 Ting Yuan-chien, Hsi-shan jih-chi, p. 1. 
14 Mao K'un, p. 21a. Also see Shen Shih-hsing's Ssu-hsien-t'ang chi, p. lOb. 
The minister of Personnel was a dream position. It had control over appoint- 
ments, promotions, and demotions, and was thus an excellent position from 
which to build a political network. See Chao I, Er-shih-er shih cha-chi, ch. 33, pp. 
485-486. 
15 Ming-shih, biography of Kuo P'u, ch. 213, p. 5642. Although Saeki Yfuichi 
(p. 32) asserts that there is little information about Tung Fen's character, evi- 
dence such as Hsui Chieh's observation and several statements by other people 
permits some conclusions to be drawn. 
16 Mao K'un, p. 20b. Also see Shen Shih-hsing's Ssu-hsien-t'ang chi, p. lOb. 
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that he could not have fallen so gently without Hsui Chieh's ap- 
proval. Years later, he even married his grandson to Hsu's grand- 
daughter and composed essays on Hsfi's birthday and other occa- 
sions, suggesting that he had somehow prepared an exit which 
helped him avoid public disgrace in 1565 and warm up the rela- 
tionship later on. 
Tung Fen's high-level network in retirement 
Tung Fen faded into obscurity at the age of 56 on account of 
the abrupt termination of his official career. The Yen Sung 
stigma made it impossible for him to stage a political comeback. 
Although he himself was no longer a player on the central stage 
of power, he was determined not to cut himself off from court 
politics. To that end he cultivated multiple kinship and teacher- 
disciple relationships. 
Tung Fen's wife, a daughter of Wu P'eng, former Minister of 
Personnel, once said to her husband, "There are no commoners 
in our families."17 Indeed none of their children and grandchil- 
dren married into ordinary families. Tung Tao-ch'un i , 
Tung Fen's only son, married the daughter of Mao K'un *. 
Mao K'un (1512-1601), also from the 1541 class and Tung's fel- 
low provincial, did not advance his career as successfully as Tung 
Fen. Yet he was regarded as an accomplished essayist and a mili- 
tary strategist in literati circles, and he had a handsome fortune. 
Tung's daughter was married to Hsiu T'ai-shih Cfi4 (cs of 1580, 
1540-1598),18 of whom more will be said later. 
As for the third generation, Tung Tao-ch'un had several chil- 
dren. The most accomplished of them was Tung Ssu-ch'eng 
(1560-1595); he married Hsui Chieh's granddaughter. Two much 
younger grandsons were Tung Ssu-yang *WPM, who became the 
son-in-law of Sun Chi-kao 1W* (1550-1610), and Tung Ssu- 
chang WM (1586-1628), who became the son-in-law of Shen 
Ching-chieh Th (1554-1631); both Sun and Shen were senior 
17 Lang Ying, Ch'i-hsiu lei-kao, hsiu-kao, ch. 6, p. 832. 
18 Hsf T'ai-shih, a native of Ch'ang-chou, Su-chou prefecture, Nan Chih-li, 
was a vice minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud. Fan Yun-lin, his son-in-law, 
wrote this biography at the request of Hsu's son. See Fan's Shu-liao-kuan chi, p. 
573. 
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government officials. The most important family tie of all was the 
marriage between Tung Fen's granddaughter and Shen Shih- 
hsing's *K4i (cs of 1562, 1535-1614) son. Tung Fen's relation- 
ship with Shen Shih-hsing, the senior grand secretary during the 
period from 1583 to 1591, exemplified a tripartite politics which 
included geographic (Shen was a native of Ch'ang-chou district, 
Su-chou prefecture), teacher-disciple (Tung was the chief of the 
1562 metropolitan examination), and marital components.19 
Another key to long-term eminence was academic success. 
Prominent families often vanished from the political and social 
scene after one or two generations due to failure in academic 
pursuits. Pressing his son and grandsons to prepare for the civil 
service examinations became Tung Fen's personal mission. He 
chose teachers and selected friends for them, people who had 
mastered the writing of examination essays. His primary goal was 
to mold his son and grandsons into competitive candidates and 
successful bureaucrats. Trained by the best tutors, Tung Ssu- 
ch'eng received his chin-shih degree at the age of 21 in 1580. His 
father Tung Tao-ch'un took his belated chin-shih in 1583. The 
much younger grandson Tung Ssu-chao *JUW got his degree at 
the remarkable age of 20 in 1595. Behind this success lay not only 
study and preparation, however, but also political connections 
and money. Tung Fen was alleged to have paid 20,000 taels of 
silver to Chang Wei WM- (cs of 1568, grand secretary, 1592-1598) 
to guarantee the chin-shih degree for Tung Ssu-chao.20 
To these impressive kinship ties and academic successes were 
added crucial teacher-disciple relationships cultivated through 
the civil service examinations. Among Tung Fen's disciples were 
Shen Shih-hsing (also, as noted, related to Tung Fen by mar- 
riage) and Wang Hsi-chuieh 3E5,- (1534-1611), the two most 
prominent members of the 1562 class. With the passing of Chang 
Chiu-cheng XJgI (1525-1582), the powerful grand secretary at 
"9 Shen Shih-hsing, birthday essay for Tung Tao-ch'un's wife, Ssu-hsien-t'ang 
chi, ch. 15, pp. 23a-b. Tung Fen was a native of Hu-chou, Che-chiang province, 
but he viewed himself as a native of Wu-chiang district (in Su-chou prefecture, 
Nan Chih-li) as well. As a matter of fact, the Tung family cemetery was in Wu- 
chiang, not to mention its extensive landed holdings there. In this sense, Tung 
Fen and Shen Shih-hsing were related not only through the teacher-disciple 
relationship and marriage, but also through their geographic affiliation with Su- 
chou. 
20 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 1111. Also see Wen Ping's Ting-ling chu-liieh, p. 119. 
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court during the first decade of the Wan-li period, these two 
emerged as a new clique of power holders. The post-Chang Chut- 
cheng era of the 1580s and beyond had a different political cast 
than the preceding decades. Following years of dominant senior 
grand secretaries, culminating with Chang Chiu-cheng, the Wan- 
li emperor (1563-1620) was determined to keep grand secretaries 
in check and weaken this office, using censors as his instru- 
ment.21 Operating in this environment, Tung Fen's proteges 
marshaled their energy to satisfy the emperor's whims on the one 
hand, and wage factional struggles on the other. They collided 
with a group of outspoken junior officials over almost every major 
government decision.22 Despite their considerably diminished 
authority, they still retained sufficient power to protect their own 
interests, build up their own faction, and block initiatives pro- 
posed by the opposition party.23 They became an indispensable 
asset for Tung Fen, providing powerful protection for his local 
interests. 
One of their loyal followers was Tung Fen's son-in-law Hsiu T'ai- 
shih. Hsi's father Hsui Liu-hsiang fJt, another chin-shih of 
1541, had had a notorious reputation for humbling himself to 
Yen Sung as his adopted son.24 In terms of pleasing the powerful 
at court, Hsui T'ai-shih obviously inherited the ingratiating skills 
of his own father and of his father-in-law, Tung Fen, whose con- 
nection with the senior grand secretaries, especially Shen Shih- 
21 The period between the 1540s and 1582 witnessed a number of powerful 
grand secretaries in charge of government affairs, beginning with Yen Sung, 
followed by Hsui Chieh, Kao Kung, and ending with Chang Chu-cheng. See Shen 
Te-fu, Wan-li yeh-huo pien, ch. 9, pp. 596-598, 641-643. After the death of Chang, 
the Wan-li Emperor played a significant role in weakening the cabinet in an 
attempt to prevent grand secretaries from becoming too powerful. Although the 
emperor was pleased with a much weaker cabinet, factional struggles arising 
from the tension between the grand secretaries and junior officials loomed on 
the horizon, and paralyzed the central bureaucracy in the end. 
22 Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming-Ch'ing chih-chi tang-she yun-tung k'ao, pp. 12-14. 
23 Wu Yuan-ts'ui, Lin-chii man-lu, ch' ien-chi, ch. 2, p. 467. Court politics dur- 
ing the post-Chang Chui-cheng era deteriorated quickly, largely due to factional 
struggles. As Ch'ien Ch'ien-i noted, "Officials working for Chiang-ling (i.e., 
Chang Cha-cheng) were competent horses, whereas officials affiliated with the 
grand secretaries after Chang were no more than shrewd foxes and cunning 
rats." These "foxes" and "rats," in his opinion, were only good at seeking their 
own interests and engaging in factional struggles. See Ch'ien's Mu-chai ch'u- 
hsiieh chi, ch. 30, p. 895. 
24 Wu Yuan-ts'ui, ch. 3, p. 92. 
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hsing and Wang Hsi-chiieh, provided Hsfi with a short cut to 
influence. Under this patronage, Hsfi T'ai-shih advanced his ca- 
reer successfully. His regular deliveries of delicacies and wine to 
his patrons earned him the nickname "chef of the senior grand 
secretaries" in official circles.25 Hsui's humble service was well 
rewarded with lucrative assignments. He was put in charge of the 
confiscated family property of Chang Chfu-cheng and allegedly 
made a huge fortune from it.26 
Meanwhile, Tung Fen assiduously cultivated relationships with 
Chiang-nan officials. He manipulated local politics by means of 
his personal prestige, his powerful connections, and generous 
presents to the local officials, as a result of which the latter always 
turned a blind eye to his family business.27 A poem satirizing its 
magistrate circulated in Wu-chiang district, Su-chou prefecture, 
Nan Chih-li, where Tung Fen had large holdings of land. Arriving 
in Wu-chiang, this new magistrate vowed to investigate the Tung 
family's misconduct. However, his resolve softened when Tung 
sent him a generous present. Someone composed the poem to 
mock how fast the magistrate had switched his position.28 
To sum up, Tung Fen had established himself firmly in the 
upper echelon of local elite. He was invulnerable owing to mul- 
tiple layers of prestige, kinship, and connections, both in the 
capital and in the Chiang-nan region. From district, to prefec- 
ture, to province, to the court, Tung had associates who could 
protect his interests. 
25 Wen Ping, Ting-ling chu-lueh, p. 168. 
26 Ibid., p. 197. 
27 Tung Fen's fellow provincial Li Yfieh, who maintained a close relationship 
with the Tung family and had been employed by Tung Fen to teach his son and 
grandsons before he received the chin-shih in 1568, reported the opinion of 
T'ang Shu 8 (1497-1574, cs 1526), a retired scholar-official who was highly 
respected in Hu-chou, on Tung Fen's involvement in local politics as follows: for 
T'ang, as Tung Fen had been the minister of Rites, a position which endowed 
him with tremendous prestige, it was not appropriate for him to spend the 
Tuan-yang festival paying visits to local officials with presents; he should have 
celebrated the festival at home with his own family. T'ang Shu's remarks reveal 
his disapproval of Tung Fen's effort to cultivate networks with local officials. See 
Li Yuieh's Chien-wen tsa-chi, p. 730. 
28 Shen Te-fu (1578-1642), a native of Chia-hsing, Che-chiang province, 
records this satiric poem in his Pi-chou-hsiuan sheng-yiu, pp. 36-37. (Saeki, pp. 30- 
31, mistakenly identified Chu Lin-ch'u, the magistrate of Wu-chiang district, as 
the author of the poem.) 
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Tung Fen's local henchmen and his pursuits of wealth and stature 
Wealth made it possible for Tung Fen to maintain a very useful 
but also very expensive network, sustain his luxurious life style, 
and satisfy his desire for land and property. His enormous landed 
holdings were not limited to his home province, as they ex- 
panded into neighboring Nan Chih-li. 
Tung Fen's pursuit of economic interests reveals a pattern of 
behavior common to many retired officials at that time. This syn- 
drome was extraordinarily widespread in the five prefectures of 
Su-chou, Sung-chiang, Chia-hsing, Hu-chou, and Hang-chou- 
the richest in Southeast China, and prefectures with a high pro- 
file of academic success.29 A gentleman from Sung-chiang ob- 
served the scholar-officials' profit-hunting frenzy and com- 
mented: 
Nowadays scholar-officials' behavior in government and in their home 
places are often inconsistent. Those who love fame act on principles when 
they serve government with the purpose of gaining good reputation. After 
their retirement, however, they manipulate local politics through their ties 
with local officials, abuse people, and seek wealth; their behavior appalls 
and disgusts local folks. Those who have lust for power hide their true desire 
in their home places in an attempt to gain good reputation from their coun- 
trymen. In government, however, they shamelessly seek profit at the cost 
of principles. These two types are evidence of a drastic decline of the ethi- 
cal standard which scholar-officials are expected to uphold.30 
Whether or not they always followed this moralist's typology, 
scholar-officials certainly enjoyed prestige and wealth associated 
with their service in the government administration. Take the 
Sung-chiang literati for example. Feng En 7,,> (1491-1571), a 
man of character during his government service, managed to 
expand his family wealth to approximately 30,000 mu of land 
after his retirement from government.3' But Feng could not com- 
pare with Hsa Chieh, who was a master at using his political 
power to enhance his pursuit of affluence. His landed wealth 
29 Chao I, Er-shilh-er shih cha-chi, ch. 34, pp. 495-496. See also Hamashima, 
Mindai K6nan noson shakai, pp. 306-335, 466-483. 
M Lu Chi, Chien-chia-t'ang tsa-chu chai-ch'ao, pp. 14-15. ProfessorJohn Meskill 
has published a solid study of the Sung-chiang literati's behavior in the sixteenth 
century: see his Gentlemanly Interests and Wealth on the Yangtze Delta. 
31 Feng Shih-k'o, Feng Yuan-ch'eng hsiuan-chi, ch. 53, p. 55b. 
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amounted to 240,000 mu of land.32 The Hsiis' landed estates were 
scattered both in Nan Chih-li and Che-chiang province. 
It was quite common for these great families to employ their 
chief servants and adopted sons to seek profit and manage 
landed estates and other sorts of business. Adoption was prac- 
ticed in sixteenth-century Chiang-nan as a major form of the 
master-servant relationship. A bond was forged by which a person 
was forced to surrender his own surname and take his master's as 
a way of pledging his loyalty and obedience. In most such cases, 
a contract was signed to witness this subjugation.33 In principle, 
the statuses of "adopted son" and of "bondservant" were distinct. 
In other words, one could be a bondservant or an adopted son, 
or both. But in reality the line between the two categories was 
often obscured. 
The contract granted the master full authority not only over 
the life of his adopted son or bondservant but also over the fate 
of the latter's family. An adopted son was placed at the mercy of 
his master. According to one observer, "As soon as the contract 
is signed, he dares not stand straight in front of his master; nor 
does he dare be negligent whenever he is called for service. 
Moreover, his descendants inherit the status of bondservant. 
Occasionally, a bondservant becomes rich and redeems himself 
by paying a large sum of money to his master. Although this 
redemption is acknowledged, he remains inferior to his master's 
family."34 An adopted son of this kind endured social discrimina- 
tion derived from his inferior status as bondservant. For example, 
32 Wu Yuan-ts'ui, ch. 1, p. 31. 
33 Liu Yuan-lin, a chin-shih of 1580, was appointed as the new governor in 
1594 after Wang Ju-hsuin had been removed in the wake of the scandal re- 
counted below. He wrapped up the investigation and filed two detailed memo- 
rials to the court concerning the cases of the Tung and Fan families. His memo- 
rials provide important information with regard to adoption and commendation 
practices. For example, Ts'ai Sung's father sold him to Chin Shih-neng and 
signed a contract to confirm the transaction of his son to Chin as the latter's 
adopted son in 1554. Ts'ai Sung's name was changed to Chin Sung. See Liu 
Yuan-lin, Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 4, p. 2a. See also a brief account of Liu Yuan-lin in 
Ming-shih, ch. 118, p. 6015. 
34 Wang Chia-chen, Yen-t'ang chien-wen tsa-chi, p. 30. Tung Han, a native of 
Sung-chiang who described the master-bondservant relationships of his time, viz. 
the late seventeenth century, suggests through his account that the basic rules 
remained the same as they had been earlier. See his San-kang shih-lueh, ch. 3, pp. 
7b-8a. 
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his family members were ineligible to take the civil service exami- 
nations. 
At the expense of personal freedom, a bondservant or adopted 
son often found himself financially better off than an impover- 
ished free man. "Given that a bondservant is often assigned to 
manage his master's business, he has a good opportunity to make 
a fortune of his own. Even a dull person in this situation doesn't 
worry about basic needs such as food and clothing."35 An adopted 
son enjoyed the protection of his adopted father. According to 
the contract, "he is not subject to outsiders' harassment. His 
master shall protect him if an outsider attempts to assault him."36 
The master-servant relationship was complex and did not al- 
ways work in favor of the master. Sometimes an adopted son 
betrayed his master by surrendering himself and his master's 
property to someone more wealthy and powerful. This betrayal 
took his old master by surprise and dragged him into a miserable 
lawsuit. He found himself confronted by the bondman's new 
master. Such legal disputes reflected aggressive land competition 
in which great families encroached upon "middle-class" families 
by seducing or encouraging the latter's adopted sons to com- 
mend their masters' property to them. Evidently, the Tung family 
engaged in those activities.37 
In fact, the relationship between Tung Fen and his adopted 
sons provides us with a perfect example of these practices as they 
flourished in the sixteenth century. He had at least fifty of 
them,38 whom he trained as his most aggressive and loyal hench- 
men in his pursuit of affluence. In the process of enriching him- 
self Tung allowed his adopted sons to build up their own family 
` Wang Chia-chen, p. 30. 
36 Ibid., p. 30. 
37 In 1580 Ts'ai Chin-sung (see above, note 33) ran into conflict with the 
sons of his late adopted father, Chin Shih-neng. He then surrendered himself 
and a portion of the property of the Chin family to the Tung family to seek its 
protection, and had his name changed to Tung Sung as a result of this second 
adoption. See Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 4, p. 9b. Ting Yuan-chien described a similar 
incident in which a servant surrendered not only his master's property but also 
the master's wife and children to the brother of Shen Shih-hsing's wife. See his 
Hsi-shan jih-chi, ch. 2. 
38 In Liu Yuan-lin's memorial dealing with the Tung case discussed below, 
fifty of the indicted servants of the Tung family were identified as Tung Fen's 
adopted sons. See Liu Yuan-lin, Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 4, pp. la-2a. 
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properties and to recruit their own henchmen through adop- 
tion.39 He even helped his favorites among them to purchase 
student status, a move which trespassed the social line between 
educated man and bondservant.40 Tung Fen's adopted sons orga- 
nized commendations, forced people to sell their lands and 
houses at cheap prices, lent money at high interest, bribed local 
officials on their master's behalf, and harassed whoever was in 
their way.4' This aggressive behavior reflected their master's 
coaching and relied upon his powerful protection. As a result, 
within three decades his family wealth had increased so drastically 
that Tung Fen became one of the richest men in Chiang-nan.42 
Adoption and commendation practices in Chiang-nan began to 
show troubling signs during the Wan-li period.43 As coerced sub- 
jugation increased, servants who were mistreated by their masters 
harbored tremendous resentment and unleashed their hatred 
violently.44 However, outbursts remained sporadic until, at the 
39 Some of Tung Fen's adopted sons were allowed by Tung to have their own 
adopted sons. Eight of the indicted servants of the Tung family were identified 
as being in this position. For example, Ts'ai Chin-sung was adopted by Tung He, 
himself Tung Fen's adopted son, and became an aggressive henchman working 
for the Tung family. See Liu, Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 4, p. 9b, 16b. 
40 Three of the indicted Tung servants purchased student status. See Che-fu 
tsou-shu, ch. 4, p. la. It should be pointed out that Tung Fen was not exceptional 
in this regard. Wu Yuan-ts'ui complained that a growing number of students in 
Chiang-nan came from bondservant background: they had purchased student 
status with the help of their masters. See his Lin-chii man-lu, ch. 2, pp. 67-68; ch. 
5, pp. 574-576. 
41 In Liu Yuan-lin's memorial, the evidence against the chief servants of the 
Tung family is overwhelming. See Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 4. 
42 This is at least what is claimed in Sheng Feng's Chia-ho cheng-hsien-lu, ch. 
6, p. 13b. 
43 In his essay, "Wan-Ming nu-pien k'ao," Hsieh Kuo-chen offers a theory on 
the evolution of the master-servant relationship during Ming times according to 
which it went through three major phases. The first phase, from the early Ming 
until the Lung-ch'ing period (1567-1572), saw a steady growth in the acquisition 
of servants and the formation of master-servant relationships. The second phase, 
between the Wan-li and T'ien-ch'i periods (1573-1627), witnessed the unruly 
conduct of the servants from great families. The last two decades of the Ming 
dynasty marked the final phase, characterized by the servants' violent riots 
against their masters. See Ming-Ch'ing chih-chi tang-she yun-tung k'ao, p. 218. 
44 Tung Ch'uan-ts'e, a chin-shih of 1550, was respected by his colleagues in 
government for his bold criticism of Yen Sung's control of court politics; in 
Sung-chiang, however, he struck his fellow natives as a man with violent im- 
pulses: there were many occasions when he tortured servants to death, and in 
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juncture of the dynastic change in the 1640s, they turned into a 
large-scale movement sweeping over the entire Chiang-nan re- 
gion and hitting the great families with a vengeance.45 Another 
serious problem during the Wan-li period was the explosion of 
public outrage against the great families' abuses, often perpe- 
trated by their chief servants and adopted sons. The Su-chou 
disturbance of 1587 against Ling Yun-i's & (cs of 1547) fam- 
ily,46 the protest of 1593, which I shall discuss in detail in a 
moment, and the Sung-chiang disturbance of 1616 against Tung 
Ch'i-ch'ang's f (cs of 1589, 1555-1636) family, exemplify 
these public protests in Chiang-nan.47 
Tung Fen's failed attempt to obtain an official eulogy 
Tung Fen reached the age of 81 in 1590, an age which naturally 
compelled him to pay more and more attention to the matter of 
death. The recent death of his son had affected him immensely, 
and the death of his wife at the end of the year made him be- 
come even more obsessed about his own mortality. 
the end he himself was violently murdered by his own servants. See Feng Shih- 
ko's Feng Yuan-ch'eng hsiian-chi, ch. 46, pp. 25a-29a. Meskill describes the murder 
of Tung in the context of Hsii Chieh's role in Sung-chiang local politics. See 
Gentlemanly Interests and Wealth on the Yangize Delta, p. 127. Shen Te-fu describes 
similar incidents in Wan-li yeh-huo pien, pu-i, pp. 2338-2339. 
45 Wu Ch'ien, Yii-ku wen-ts'un, ch. 13, p. 6. Also see Wang Chia-chen, Yen- 
t'ang chien-wen tsa-chi, pp. 4-8, 30. Both accounts provide us with important in- 
formation regarding the servant riots at the juncture of dynastic change. 
Nakayama Hachir6 discusses the issue concerning the servant riots in his essay, 
"Ban Min no doka dohen," in Nakayama, Min Shin shi ronshui (Tokyo, Kyuiko 
shoin, 1995), pp. 306-312. 
46 Wen Ping, Ting-ling chu-lieh, pp. 456-457. 
47 As the Sung-chiang disturbance came to an end, an anonymous essay 
entitled Min-ch'ao Tung-huan shih-shih M circulated in the area, provid- 
ing abundant information with regard to the wrongdoings of Tung Ch'i-ch'ang's 
family, the local people's outrage against the Tung family, and the provincial 
government's role in resolving this crisis. The essay is included in You-man-lou 
ts'ung-shu, vol. I, pp. la-41b. Wen Ping also records the Sung-chiang disturbance: 
see Ting-ling chu-luieh, pp. 468-469. Shen Ping-hsuin later included Wen Ping's 
account in his Ch'uian-chai laojen pi-chi, ch. 3, pp. llb-12a. Nelson Wu, "Tung 
Ch'i-ch'ang: apathy in government and fervor in art," pp. 286-288, briefly de- 
scribes the disturbance of 1616 against the Tung family. Fu 1-ling also discusses 
those major disturbances in Ming-tai Chiang-nan shih-min ching-chi shih-t'an, pp. 
118-122. 
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Tung Fen, reflecting on his 80 years, must have felt satisfaction 
that nothing had really prevented him from getting what he 
desired-power, wealth, and academic success. What he wanted 
very much now was to look forward to an elaborate funeral with 
an official eulogy. As the former minister of Rites, however, Tung 
Fen knew that his past government service created considerable 
difficulty in achieving this goal. According to regulations, the 
court did not offer official condolences to officials, such as him- 
self, who had been impeached and subsequently removed from 
office.48 Yet principle often yielded to politics; his relatives and 
prot6g6s were senior court officials who would help him to work 
this out. 
The maneuver began with a rather modest request. It was Ts'ai 
Hsi-chou *MS, a touring censor in Che-chiang province, who 
took the initiative. He was known as one of the eight attack dogs 
commanded by Shen Shih-hsing and Wang Hsi-chfieh. Appar- 
ently on behalf of his patrons,49 he submitted a memorial to the 
court in which he suggested that the government should consider 
offering a courtesy greeting to the aging Tung Fen, former min- 
ister of Rites.50 
Ts'ai Hsi-chou's memorial triggered a court debate. The oppo- 
sition to his request was led by Wan Kuo-ch'in AMk, also a 
censor. In his argument, not only did Wan remind his colleagues 
of Tung Fen's history of association with Yen Sung, but he also 
exposed Tung's horrendous behavior in local society. He charged 
that Tung Fen manipulated local politics and abused local 
people. Because of his powerful connections, local officials 
bowed to him and dared not investigate; his neighbors were fu- 
rious, but dared not speak out. Wan then argued, "If we were to 
approve this request, he (Tung) would go around to encroach 
more land and take away more wives and daughters from ordi- 
nary people. What is worse, to approve this request is only the 
beginning; it would pave the way for a second request asking for 
48 Ming-shih, ch. 60, p. 1484. 
49 Wu Yuan-ts'ui commented that Ts'ai Hsi-chou's motive was to please the 
senior court officials (Wang Hsi-chuieh and Shen Shih-hsing). See Lin-chii man- 
lu, ch. 6, p. 321. Shen Te-fu made similar comments. See Wan-li yeh-huo pien, ch. 
13, pp. 892-895. Also see Wen Ping's Ting-ling chu-liueh, pp. 108-109; and Wan-li 
ti-ch'ao, p. 734. 
50 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 512. See also Ming-shih, biography of Wan Kuo-ch'in, ch. 
230, p. 6011. 
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official condolences and a third one for a posthumous title for 
himself when he dies."51 Wan concluded: 
If we were to approve this request, the decision itself would insult the 
entire scholar-official community. Tung Fen was impeached and removed 
from office. He has since remained a guilty man. I wonder whether this 
request asks the court to pay a courtesy greeting to a former minister or to 
a guilty person.52 
Wan's sharp criticism zeroed in on Tung Fen's ulterior motive 
to seek official posthumous condolences. Tung's associates un- 
derstood that their support for the request would probably cause 
tremendous embarrassment if the opposition party should insist 
on an official investigation. They decided to have the matter 
dropped quietly. Tung Fen must have been well informed by his 
associates concerning the whole debate and must have been pro- 
foundly disappointed. There was nothing he could do; he had to 
be patient and wait for another opportunity. Meanwhile, how- 
ever, his associates at court wasted no time in retaliating. A few 
months later, Wan Kuo-ch'in was cashiered.53 
Tung Fen suffered a further disappointment affecting his capi- 
tal contacts. It had to do with Tung Ssu-ch'eng. They were so 
close as grandfather and grandson, yet they were so far apart in 
their vision of politics and ethics. The grandfather was famously 
greedy, cunning, and shameless, while the grandson was known 
for his modesty, idealism, and uprightness.54 The grandfather 
had been dismissed from office because of his association with 
Yen Sung. Now the grandson was removed from office because of 
his involvement in what is known as the kuo-pen F4* controversy. 
This controversy, relating to the imperial succession, touched the 
most sensitive spot of the Wan-li emperor's private life. The 
emperor, reluctant to name his eldest son as crown prince, fa- 
vored another son by his favorite consort. When several officials 
submitted memorials criticizing him for postponing the decision, 
the furious emperor had one of them beaten in court, and the 
51 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 513. 
52 Ibid., p. 513. 
53 Ibid., p. 532. Also see Wen Ping, Ting-ling chu-luieh, pp. 198-199. 
54 Mao Kuo-chin *9Rm, Tung Ssu-ch'eng's maternal uncle, wrote a biogra- 
phy of Tung Ssu-ch'eng which is included in the latter's Tung li-pu chi, pp. lb- 
4b. See also Fan Yun-lin, Shu-liao-kuan chi, biography of Tung Ssu-ch'eng, pp. 
601-602. Both Mao and Fan expressed their high opinion of Tung Ssu-ch'eng. 
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rest demoted.55 Witnessing the brutal way in which the emperor 
raged against the outspoken censors, Tung Ssu-ch'eng dared 
support his colleagues by submitting a critical memorial. He too 
was discharged in 1592.56 
Apparently, Tung Ssu-ch'eng attempted to serve with a good 
conscience and compensate with his own clean record for his 
grandfather's disgrace. Nevertheless, he found himself extremely 
uneasy amidst the factional struggles between his grandfather's 
close associates and the opposition party: the fact that he sup- 
ported the opposition in the kuo-pen dispute could only irritate 
his grandfather's friends. 
Tung Fen under siege, 1593-1595 
Back in Chiang-nan, Tung Ssu-ch'eng was immensely disturbed 
by his grandfather's lavish parties with friends. Being sensitive to 
a growing discontent among local people, he urged Tung Fen to 
give out some portion of his wealth to the poor, discipline his 
henchmen's unruly behavior, and live a modest life. His advice 
did nothing but infuriate Tung Fen. Compelled to be silent on 
family matters, Tung Ssu-ch'eng expressed his frustration to a 
friend in the following terms: "I would like to pray for Buddha 
never to have me be reborn in an official family in my next life."57 
He seemed to sense that misfortune was about to befall his family. 
The year 1593 witnessed the beginning of a big crisis which was 
to haunt Tung Fen until his death. There was a sudden eruption 
of public outrage against the Tungs. Angry mobs protested 
against their unbridled pursuit of wealth and abuse of power. 
Protests materialized in several districts in Che-chiang province 
and in Nan Chih-li, where the family owned large landed hold- 
ings, businesses, and pawnshops. 
The protests began in the district of Wu-chiang -TiZ, Su-chou 
prefecture, in Nan Chih-li, where the Tung family's holdings 
55 Hsieh Kuo-chen, pp. 14-17. 
56 Mao Kuo-chin, in Tung li-pu chi, pp. 2b-3a. See also Fan Yun-lin, Shu-liao- 
kuan chi, pp. 604-605. Tung Ssu-ch'eng's involvement in the kuo-pen controversy 
and his subsequent dismissal is recorded in major works such as Ming-shih, ch. 
233, p. 6075; Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 629; and T'an Ch'ien's Kuo-ch'iieh, ch. 76, p. 4665. 
57 Mao Kuo-chin, in Tung li-pu chi, p. 4b. 
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amounted to approximately 20,000 mu. Seven landed estates 
there were looted by the mob.58 Fearing that the clamor would 
spread, Tung Ssu-ch'eng decided to return some of the land to 
its original owners; almost half of the Tung properties were lost 
as a result.59 This concession did not stop the protests; on the 
contrary, they spread rapidly into Tung Fen's home district of 
Wu-ch'eng ,%tV, in Hu-chou prefecture, Che-chiang province. Ev- 
ery day hundreds gathered in front of his house shouting and 
demanding the return of their lands improperly taken by the 
Tung family. Tung Ssu-ch'eng tried again to buy off the angry 
people. He posted a notice on the door of his house, "Those who 
come with hate get nothing; those who come with manners re- 
ceive rewards."60 This notice invited an even larger crowd eager 
to receive compensation. Within a few months, the Tung family 
lost two-tenths of its landed wealth, while the protests went on.6l 
One offUlcial who sympathized with the Tungs commented: "The 
Tung family's wealth has a limit, but the mob's desire has no 
limit."62 Tung Ssu-ch'eng was now caught in the middle between 
his grandfather, who was furious about the way in which he 
handled the crisis, and the mob who hardly appreciated his con- 
cession.63 
The widespread protests forced the provincial administration to 
step in. WangJu-hsun 3Rf;Alll (1551-1610), the provincial governor 
of Che-chiang, reported to the central government that thou- 
sands of people rallied in front of his offUlce crying for justice. "If 
I had not responded to this crisis promptly," the governor wrote, 
"it could have escalated into a violent riot."64 Wang had to choose 
between pleasing Tung Fen by using force to disperse the mob 
58 Tung Fen, Miyuan chi, ch. 8, p. 7a. 
59 Tung Ssu-ch'eng, Tung li-pu chi, ch. 1, pp. 15a-b. 
(;° Mao Kuo-chin, in Tung li-pu chi, p. 3a. 
til Sun Chi-kao described the local protest against the Tung family in his 
epitaph for Tung Ssu-ch'eng's mother. See Sun tsungpo chi, p. 76b. Also see 
Tung Ssu-chang's brief description of the crisis in the biography of his elder 
brother Tung Ssu-hsin, Ching-hsiao-chai i-wen, ch. 2, p. 6a. And see Li Yueh, 
CZaien-wen tsa-chi, p. 444. 
62 Tung Fen, ch. 8, p. 8b. The official was Chu Lin-ch'u, the magistrate of 
Wu-chiang, who had received generous presents from Tung Fen and was impli- 
cated in the sarcastic poem mentioned above. 
63 Mao Kuo-chin, in Tung lipu chi, p. 3b. Also see the section on Tung Ssu- 
ch'eng in Shen Te-fu's Pi-chou-hsuan sheng-yu, pp. 8-9. 
64 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 838. See also Wen Ping, Ting-ling chu-lueh, p. 459. 
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and appeasing the angry people by promising them a fair inves- 
tigation. He chose the latter. With the aide of his colleagues 
P'eng Ying-ts'an ; a touring censor in Che-chiang province 
at that time, and Chang Ying-wang , the magistrate of Wu- 
ch'eng district, the governor looked into the legal complaints 
which charged the Tung family with numerous counts of miscon- 
duct. A number of chief servants from the Tung family were 
arrested and interrogated.65 Protesters hailed the provincial 
administration's endeavor to redress abuses, and filed their com- 
plaints with the local government. 
Tung Fen considered the provincial administration's position 
shocking. In a letter to an influential scholar-official, he bitterly 
complained that this official investigation was unprecedented in 
Hu-chou prefecture.66 Heretofore, Tung had turned local offi- 
cials into his "friends" using presents and reminders of his capital 
connections. Now Tung was convinced that the provincial gover- 
nor of Che-chiang and the governor of Nan Chih-li (who was 
cooperating with the former since many holdings of the Tungs 
lay in his jurisdiction), both Shan-tung natives and same-year chin- 
shih, had teamed up to give him a hard time.67 Indeed, these two 
were neither proteges, nor relatives, nor Tung's fellow provin- 
cials. In other words, they did not associate with his network, and 
therefore they did not feel obligated to protect his interests. 
Moreover, the two governors, motivated by a sense of justice, 
committed themselves to aggressively pursuing high-profile 
cases.68 
Tung Fen's counterattack 
Never before had Tung Fen been subjected to such intense 
public humiliations and pressures from a provincial investigation. 
His grandson's conciliatory approach failed; and his own political 
65 Tung Fen, ch. 8, p. 7b. See also Tung Ssu-ch'eng's Tung li-pu chi, ch. 2, 
p. 3a. 
66 Tung Fen, ch. 8, p. 7b. 
67 Ibid., ch. 9., p. 3b. 
68 Chu Hung-mo, the governor of Nan Chih-li, had received the chin-shih in 
the same year (1571) as governor Wang Ju-hsuin. See Ming-shih, biography of 
Chu Hung-mo, ch. 227, p. 5963; biography of Wang Ju-hsfun, ch. 235, pp. 6117- 
6119. 
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technique of manipulating local officials did not work because he 
had no connection with the current governors. Tung's remaining 
option was to use his capital connections to block the on-going 
official inquiry. At the age of 85, he was going to fight his last 
fight to prevent his family wealth from being shattered. 
In fact, the Tung family was not the only target of the demon- 
strations. Fan Ying-ch'i JMM (cs of 1565, 1527-1594), a native of 
Hu-chou prefecture, also became a target of public rage. He had 
been an Imperial Tutor and Chancellor of the Imperial Academy 
before he was dismissed from office. Fan and Tung were related 
by marriage and maintained an informal teacher-student relation- 
ship. Over the years, Fan and his son were notorious in local 
society for their horrendous misconduct, and therefore were 
under fierce attack from the mob. Fan's son, charged with nu- 
merous wrongdoings, knew that the official investigation would 
hold him accountable. Afraid of prosecution, he committed sui- 
cide in the third month of Wan-li 22 (1594).69 Fan Ying-ch'i, a 
proud and volatile man, was under extreme stress. The continu- 
ous protests, betrayal by servants, infighting in the household, 
official investigations, and most dreadfully, the death of his eldest 
son, drove him to the edge. Two months after his son's suicide, 
no longer able to endure the humiliations and pressure, he 
hanged himself.70 
This incident had explosive consequences. The provincial gov- 
ernment immediately began investigating and arrested some sus- 
pects.71 The suicides, on the other hand, played right in the 
hands of Tung Fen in his confrontation with the provincial ad- 
ministration. The Tungs and Fans changed quickly from defense 
to offense. What probably happened next is that Tung Fen imme- 
diately collaborated with Fan Ying-ch'i's widow to draft a com- 
plaint.72 She accused the mob of violating her family compound. 
They smashed the houses, killed pigs and sheep, drank and 
shouted in the living room, intruded in the bedrooms, and 
chopped down all the trees in the Fan family cemetery. In addi- 
tion, the mob's attack frightened her nephew's pregnant wife to 
69 Liu Yuan-lin, Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 5, p. 9b. 
7( Ibid., ch. 5, p. lla. See also Li Yiueh, Chien-wen tsa-chi, pp. 445-446. 
71 Liu Yuan-lin, ch. 5, pp. llb-12b. 
72 This information comes from Shen Ping-hsan. See his Ch'uian-chai lao-jen 
pi-chi, ch. 3, p. 8b. 
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death. All of these outrages, which led to the death of her hus- 
band and son, could have been avoided had the provincial gov- 
ernment dealt with the local disturbances differently.73 Soon 
Widow Fan was on her way to the capital with her lament. She 
appealed directly to the central government, crying for justice. 
Meanwhile, Tung Fen was getting intelligence and support from 
friends in the capital. Above all, he was working his contacts to 
assure a hearing for her complaint. 
Incidentally, it turned out that virtually all of her charges were 
false, as attested to by the report prepared by the new governor, 
Liu Yuan-lin WCALI, who replaced Wang Ju-hsiin. After a thor- 
ough investigation, Liu wrote that her nephew's wife had been 
sick for a long time (not pregnant) and had died in early 1593; 
contrary to the widow's charge, it was her husband's chief servant 
who shocked her to death. The nephew dared not file a lawsuit 
against that servant. As for the charges related to the mob's intru- 
sion into the family compound, the governor reported that the 
houses stood magnificent without having lost a single piece of 
wood or brick; the family cemetery was covered with thick vegeta- 
tion and tall trees; and no one had gone into the family com- 
pound smashing, killing pigs and sheep, drinking and making 
noise, as she alleged.74 
Before any of these facts were known, the complaint of Fan's 
widow reached to the Wan-li emperor. The emperor reportedly 
became outraged by the news that Fan Ying-ch'i, his former tutor, 
killed himself under pressure both from the mob and from the 
provincial administration's investigation. An imperial edict was 
issued which removed governor Wang and dispatched imperial 
guards to arrest censor P'eng Ying-ts'an and magistrate Chang 
Ying-wang.75 These three were blamed for having mishandled the 
73 In his report concerning the Fan case, Liu Yuan-lin quoted a substantial 
portion from the complaint filed by Fan Ying-ch'i's widow. See Che-fu tsou-shu, 
ch. 5, pp. 2Qb-27a. 
74 Liu Yuan-lin wrapped up the official investigation and submitted two de- 
tailed reports to the court, which presented plenty of evidence regarding the 
wrongdoings of the chief servants of Tung and Fan, and recorded the official 
decision on each charge. As for his report regarding the widow's accusations, 
see Che-fu tsou-shu, ch. 5, pp. 26b-27b. 
75 According to Wen Ping, the imperial edict was issued in the 10th month 
of Wan-li 22 (1594). See Ting-ling chu-liieh, pp. 458-459. Also see Wan-li ti-ch'ao, 
p. 864. Chang Ying-wang, a native of Kao-ch'un, Chiang-ning prefecture, Nan 
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suppression of the disturbances. A later edict dismissed Wang 
from office, deprived P'eng of his official status, and exiled 
Chang to a remote region.76 When several officials suggested that 
the court should carefully question the widow's complaint, they 
were reprimanded and demoted.77 The imperial edict left no 
room for investigating whether or not the woman's accusations 
were true, nor any room for listening to the provincial govern- 
ment's appeal to the court. 
Among those concerned with the case at the time, a divergence 
of opinion emerged as to whether Tung Fen could actually have 
pulled strings in this way. Was Fan's widow capable of bringing 
down a provincial administration by herself, and so quickly? 
Could her complaint possibly have reached the emperor without 
help from senior officials? Rumors circulated that Tung Fen had 
orchestrated the whole counterattack. 
Tung Ssu-ch'eng repudiated such assertions as slanderous, bas- 
ing his argument on the claim that his grandfather was dying and 
in no condition to do what people were saying. He suggested that 
the disposition of the case was based solely on its merits, and 
offered no explanation of how Widow Fan could have gotten a 
hearing. In his letter to a government official, he wrote, "Thanks 
to his majesty's decision and the public opinion at court, the Fan 
case is resolved."78 It was absolutely outrageous, he said, that his 
grandfather, a man who quietly waited for his final destiny, was 
being ruthlessly slandered. "My grandfather is dying, I am no 
better than cold ashes, and my family is like a broken jar."79 This 
Chih-li, took his chin-shih in 1592. The court decision to exile him was viewed 
by many people as being extremely harsh and unfair. See the 1880 edition of 
Chiang-ningfu-chih, ch. 38, p. 22b. 
76 Wen Ping, p. 461. According to Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 882, the second edict was 
issued in the 2nd month of Wan-li 23 (1595). Also see Ming-shih, ch. 235, p. 
6118. T'ang Hsien-tsu, appalled by the court intervention, expressed his moral 
support to his friends P'eng Ying-ts'an, Wang Ju-hsan, and Chang Ying-wang in 
his correspondence. See T'ang Hsien-tsu chi, ch. 12, pp. 457-458; ch. 45, p. 1262, 
p. 1274; ch. 47, p. 1360. 
77 Two junior censors submitted memorials to defend P'eng Ying-ts'an. They 
were demoted right away. See Ming-shih, ch. 235, p. 6118; Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 865. 
Sun P'ei-yang, Minister of Personnel, submitted a memorial later in which he 
urged the emperor to reconsider his decision. The memorial was ignored. See 
Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 870-871. 
7x Tung Ssu-ch'eng, p. 5a. 
79 hIbzd.p n a.5 
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is indeed a bleak picture of a fragmented family with its head- 
an 85-year-old invalid man-waiting for death. 
Since the case represents a striking example of influence, it 
merits a review of whether, as the grandson claimed, such a thing 
was impossible given Tung Fen's rapidly failing health. Two docu- 
ments by Tung Ssu-ch'eng, the letter and the biography, provide 
inconsistent evidence. According to the biography, Tung Fen's 
health began to deteriorate in 1594. By the end of the year he 
"could hardly sleep well at night. Outsiders saw him talking and 
smiling as usual during the day, but they had no idea that frus- 
tration and agony were eating away his spirit." And after seeing 
off his grandson, Tung Ssu-ch'eng's younger brother Tung Ssu- 
chao, who was bound for the capital and the metropolitan exami- 
nation, "he took my brother's hands and wept as if he would not 
see him again. Within a month, Grandfather fell ill; he did not 
eat nor sleep."80 Tung Fen passed away in the third month of 
Wan-li 23 (1595); for Tung Ssu-ch'eng, the crisis had contributed 
to his grandfather's death.8' 
Inconsistent with his use of his grandfather's failing health to 
argue that Tung Fen, in his final agony, was in no condition to 
engineer political reprisals, Tung Ssu-ch'eng himself noted that 
Tung Fen traveled three hundred li when he saw his grandson off 
to the examinations. He said that his grandfather had been in 
good health and full of energy. Those who knew him predicted 
that he would live to the age of 100.82 There is no indication that 
Tung Fen was struck with any serious illness during the period of 
time that elapsed between Fan Ying-ch'i's suicide and the inter- 
vention of the court, which took place in the tenth month of 
Wan-li 22 (1594). On the contrary, his own correspondence 
shows that he was actively seeking support. We learn from Tung 
Fen's letters that Shen Ching-chieh (whose daughter was married 
to Tung's grandson) contacted one of Tung's associates in the 
capital. This meeting resulted in the latter's personal letter to the 
governor of Nan Chih-li on behalf of Tung Fen and in the fact 
that Tung was provided with a copy of governor Wang's sup- 
posedly confidential memorial concerning the investigation.83 
80 Mao K'un, Mao K'un wen-chi, ch. 3, pp. 23b-24a. 
81 Ibid, p. 24b. 
82 Ibid., p. 24b. 
83 Tung Fen, ch. 9, pp. 2b-3a. 
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Moreover, Tung Ssu-ch'eng's writings contain letters to his grand- 
father's court associates, indicating that Tung Fen was mobilizing 
his proteges and relatives to rescue him.84 
Substantiating the claim of Tung Fen's involvement is a much 
later witness, Shen Ping-hsun iIi, who lived in the late seven- 
teenth and early eighteenth centuries. Shen's family and the 
Tungs had been closely related through marriage for genera- 
tions, which probably gave him access to inside information.85 
Disagreeing with a mid-seventeenth century account that dis- 
cussed the Fan suicides,86 Shen pointed out: 
The death of Fan (Ying-ch'i) was actually related to the provincial 
administration's memorial against Tung Fen. Thanks to Tung's powerful 
connections at court, the provincial officials received extremely severe pen- 
alties. Otherwise, a woman's complaint alone would not have been able to 
bring down the top provincial officials.87 
84 Among his correspondence with his grandfather's capital associates were 
letters to Wang Hsi-chuieh and Shen Shih-hsing. In a letter to Wang, Tung Ssu- 
ch'eng expressed his gratitude to him and to Shen Shih-hsing for their involve- 
ment in helping the Tungs out of the crisis. See Tung li-pu chi, ch. 2, pp. 2b-3a. 
Also see two letters to Sun Chi-kao, ch. 1, pp. 6b-7a; ch. 2, pp. llb-13a. 
85 Shen Ping-hsuin, Ch'uian-chai lao-jen pi-chi, ch. 3, pp. 14b-15a. Shen Ping- 
hsan was a descendent of Shen Ching-chieh, the man who had married his 
daughter to Tung Ssu-chang, Tung Fen's grandson, and who helped the Tung 
family out of the dire situation. Shen Ping-hsuin's own maternal grandfather was 
Tung Fen's great-grandson. The Tung case during his time was no more than 
a piece of past local history; moreover, by then the Tung family could no longer 
maintain its social prestige and wealth. Therefore there was no need for him to 
keep his inside information secret. Sketchy information about Shen Ping-hsuin 
is found in the entry regarding his elder brother Shen Ping-chen ' I (1679- 
1738) in Arthur W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (Washing- 
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 644-645. Ping-chen, Ping- 
hsan, and Ping-ch'ien M (b. 1685), another brother, were well-respected 
scholars in their time. 
86 Shen Ping-hsfin was critical of Wen Ping's " account, which was in his 
view limited to the Fan suicide and the court decision. Wen Ping, eldest son of 
Wen Chen-meng : (1574-1636, grand secretary, 1635), committed suicide 
when the Ch'ing government pressed him to serve the Manchu court. See L. 
Carrington Goodrich and Fang Chao-ying, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, 
1368-1644, vol. II, p. 1644. Wen Ping wrote several books, including the Ting-ling 
chu-liieh, where there is a description of the Hu-chou disturbance related to the 
case of Fan Ying-ch'i (pp. 458-461). 
87 Shen Ping-hsuin, ch. 3, p. 8a. 
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Still according to Shen, 
Tung (Fen) was in a much more serious situation than Fan (Ying-ch'i). Legal 
complaints against Tung numbered in the thousands. Hundreds of people 
stayed outside his house every day demanding the return of their lands. 
The investigation report would soon be completed and submitted to the 
court. Under tremendous pressure, Tung was desperately looking for an 
opening that could be used to attack the provincial administration. Fan and 
Tung were related through marriage and teacher-disciple relationship. Fan 
always consulted Tung on important matters. Fan asked Tung how to cope 
with this crisis.88 
Shen felt that this conversation heightened Fan Ying-ch'i's fear 
and drove him to mental collapse and suicide. Then, 
Tung Fen helped Fan's widow to draft the complaint and urged her to go 
to the capital the day after the death of Fan. At the same time, he encour- 
aged his powerful associates at court to take care of her appeal. Before P'eng 
Ying-ts'an's memorial arrived in the capital, the imperial edict to arrest P'eng 
had been issued. P'eng's memorial was blocked. What a magic spin and 
maneuver!89 
Shen Ping-hsuin's testimony supports the allegations regarding 
Tung Fen's role in the counterattack. If Tung was indeed a dying 
man in 1594, he surely remained capable of some rather remark- 
able feats. He used Fan's suicide as a turning point from which 
to mastermind a superb counterattack. His associates opened the 
way for Fan's widow to approach the Wan-li emperor, blocked the 
provincial memorial from going to the emperor, and gave no 
opportunity for the accused to defend themselves. As soon as the 
emperor's temper was aroused, Tung Fen's associates delivered 
an imperial edict which knocked down his enemies-the pro- 
vincial governor, the censor, and the magistrate of Wu-ch'eng 
district. 
Conclusion 
The court intervention blocking the provincial investigation of 
the Tung family was not unprecedented. A precursor to the case 
88 Ibid., ch. 3, pp. 8a-8b. 
89 Ibid., ch. 3, p. 8b. It is important to note that Shen Ping-hsun did not 
originate, but only reinforced, the view that Tung Fen masterminded the whole 
counterattack which successfully toppled the top provincial officials. Shen's take 
on this issue has its special merit owing to his family's close ties with the Tung 
family. T'an Ch'ien too held the same position. See Kuo-ch'ueh, ch. 76, p. 4739. 
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of Tung Fen was Hsui Chieh's use of his capital connections to 
knock down his enemy HaiJui SM (1513-1587), the governor of 
Nan Chih-li. In 1570-71, Hai Jui took tough measures to investi- 
gate the misconduct of Hsu's family. Hsfi had Hai Jui removed 
from the governorship and the investigation shut down by means 
of a court intervention.90 
Tung Fen, like Hsut Chieh, was no ordinary wealthy provincial. 
He was a cunning politician who knew exactly how the political 
system worked and had great capacity to manipulate politics to 
satisfy his needs. His close connections with power holders se- 
cured his presence in local politics and protected his family's 
wealth and prestige in local society. 
To a considerable degree, the dispute between the provincial 
administration and Tung Fen was an unfortunate coincidence. 
This happened not only because the governor was not associated 
with Tung's network, but also because he intended to exercise his 
full judicial authority as the representative of the state over the 
dispute between the Tung family and the angry locals. This was 
an unusual combination of circumstances. The dispute was 
abruptly resolved by the court intervention, the result of a desper- 
ate but carefully crafted counterattack which enabled Tung Fen 
to turn the tables on his prosecutors and emerge victorious. 
Tung Fen's case shows us how central and local politics were 
intricately interrelated to create "safe havens" and protect the 
great families' interests in local society. Networks of kinship, re- 
gional affiliations, and teacher-disciple relationships linked local 
elites to power holders at court. In this regard, local politics in a 
large prefecture like Hu-chou was not just local, and residents of 
elite status were not simply local elites. They sometimes had the 
ability to overturn a governor's decision, close investigations, or 
even remove provincial officials from office. 
The Tung family survived a major crisis, but its victory was 
shadowed by three deaths. Tung Fen passed away in the third 
month of Wan-li 23 (1595). Within a month, his grandson Tung 
Ssu-chao, who had just received his chin-shih degree, died unex- 
pectedly in the capital. The passing of his grandfather and 
brother broke the heart of Tung Ssu-ch'eng, and he too died at 
the end of that year. They had enjoyed power, prestige, and 
9( Wu Yuan-ts'ui, Lin-chiu man-lu, ch. 1, p. 31. 
This content downloaded from 130.111.46.40 on Fri, 3 May 2013 15:39:02 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
162 
JIE ZHAO 
wealth for several decades. With the loss of its three chin-shih degree holders, however, the heyday of the Tung family was over. 
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